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Abstract 
A new hazard analysis technique, called System-Theoretic Process Analysis, is capable of 
identifying potential hazardous design flaws, including software and system design errors and 
unsafe interactions among multiple system components. Detailed procedures for performing the 
hazard analysis were developed and the feasibility and utility of using it on complex systems was 
demonstrated by applying it to the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency H-II Transfer Vehicle. 
In a comparison of the results of this new hazard analysis technique to those of the standard fault 
tree analysis used in the design and certification of the H-II Transfer Vehicle, System-Theoretic 
Hazard Analysis found all the hazardous scenarios identified in the fault tree analysis as well as 
additional causal factors that had not been) identified by fault tree analysis.  
I. Introduction 
  Spacecraft losses are increasing stemming from subtle and complex interactions among system components. The 
loss of the Mars Polar Lander is an example [1]. The problems arise primarily because the growing use of software 
allows engineers to build systems with a level of complexity that precludes exhaustive testing and thus assurance of 
the removal of all design errors prior to operational use [2,3] Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) were created long ago to analyze primarily electro-mechanical systems and identify 
potential losses due to component failure. They are based on reliability theory. Our new complex, software-intensive 
designs, however, need more powerful analysis approaches that go beyond component failure to identify additional 
causes of accidents. While engineers have tried to extend these traditional techniques in ad hoc ways, the 
identification of causal scenarios involving subtle and unidentified interactions among components and system 
design errors (including requirements errors) are not easily handled by these techniques, if at all. The ad hoc nature 
of the extensions means that there is no way to systematically ensure that cases have not been omitted. The problem 
is that the underlying accident causality model of these techniques, which assumes that accidents are caused by 
chains of directly related component failure events, does not include all the types of accident that we are now having 
in our software-intensive systems and the types of flawed human decision making involved. 
This paper describes a new hazard analysis technique, called Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), which 
is based on concepts in systems theory and control theory. STPA identifies the traditional causes of losses identified 
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by FTA and FMEA, but it also identifies additional causes. The technique works on an engineering model of the 
system and has well-defined steps, which are potentially at least partially automatable. The next two sections 
describe STPA and the underlying extended causality model, called STAMP (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model 
and Processes), on which it is based. The new analysis technique is demonstrated by its application to the JAXA 
(Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency) H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV). The results of the FTA used to certify the 
HTV are compared with the results of STPA on the same design. 
II. STAMP: An Extended Accident Causation Model 
Accidents, which in STAMP are defined very generally as unacceptable losses, have traditionally been 
conceived as occurring from a sequence of directly related failure events, each of which leads to the next event in 
the chain of events. With increased system complexity and the introduction of software, which does not “fail” in the 
sense that hardware does, new accident processes are arising. STPA (System-Theoretic Process Analysis) is built on 
the foundation of an extended accident model that includes the traditional chain-of-failure-events model but extends 
it to include losses arising from system design errors, software requirements errors, system engineering flaws, and 
organizational and managerial deficiencies. 
In STAMP [4], accidents are complex processes that include a chain of failure events as a subset. Systems are 
conceived as being a collection of interacting control loops. In this causality model, losses result from a lack of 
adequate control over the behavior of the system components rather than simply component failures. There is a set 
of constraints related to the behavior of the system components (physical, human, or social) that enforces the desired 
system property. Losses occur when the behavior of the components or the interactions among the components 
violate these constraints. The constraints are enforced by controls and controllers. 
Thus system safety in STAMP is treated as a dynamic control problem rather than a component failure problem. 
For example, the O-ring did not control the propellant gas release by sealing the gap in the field joint of the Space 
Shuttle Challenger. The software did not adequately control the descent speed of the Mars Polar Lander [1]. The 
development process did not adequately control the generation of the load tape in the 1999 Titan IV/Centaur/Milstar 
loss [5]. 
The concept of control is used very generally in STAMP. Component failures and unsafe component interactions 
or behavior may be controlled through design (e.g., redundancy, interlocks, fail-safe design) or through process, in 
which the controls may include the development processes, manufacturing processes and procedures, maintenance 
processes, and operations. Control may also be implemented by managerial, organizational, or social controls. 
In STAMP, emphasis is changed from “prevent failures” to “enforce safety constraints on system design”. 
Losses are not simply the result of an event or a chain of events but involve a complex, dynamic process. The events 
themselves result from a lack of enforcement of safety constraints in system design and operations. If the larger, 
dynamic process is not considered, potential causes of losses may be missed in the design and analysis process and 
be uncontrolled in design and operations. 
In general, losses in STAMP occur in three ways. The first way is that the control structure or control actions do 
not enforce the safety constraints, resulting in unhandled or uncontrolled component failures, unhandled 
environmental disturbances or conditions, or unsafe interactions among system components. The second occurs 
when control actions are inadequately coordinated among multiple controllers. The third is that the control structure 
degrades over time and becomes inadequate. 
There is one other important concept in STAMP, which is the role of process/mental models in losses. Fig. 1 
illustrates the basic systems theory concept that every controller must contain a model of the system it is controlling. 
In humans, the process model is usually called a mental model. The process model is used by the controller to 
determine what control actions to implement. Accidents, particularly those involving software and human errors, 
often occur because the process model becomes inconsistent with the actual state of the controlled process causing 
incorrect control actions to be issued. For example, in the Mars Polar Lander (MPL), the software thought that the 
spacecraft was on the surface of the planet and shut off the descent engines. Process models are kept consistent with 
the process state either through prediction (feedforward control) or through feedback (feedback control). The 
concept of process model inconsistency with the actual controlled system provides a much better explanation of 
software or human control errors than conceiving of them as random component failure. 
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How do the process models become inconsistent with the state of the controlled systems? They may be wrong 
from the beginning, there may be missing or incorrect feedback, the algorithm being implemented by the controller 
may update the models incorrectly, or time lags may not be properly accounted for. The result may be uncontrolled 
process states, uncontrolled disturbances, or inadvertently commanding the system into a hazardous state. 
The causes of an accident in STAMP listed earlier can then be augmented with four types of unsafe control 
actions, i.e., accidents occur when the controllers’ process models do not match the actual state of the process and 1) 
a control action required to avoid a loss is not provided or is not followed, 2) an unsafe control action is provided, 3) 
a potentially safe control action is given at the wrong time (too early, too late, or in the wrong sequence), or 4) a 
control action required for safety is stopped too soon or is applied too long (for nondiscrete commands). 
STPA is a hazard analysis method based on the STAMP accident causality model. It starts from fundamental 
system engineering activities, including the identification of losses or accidents to be avoided, the hazardous 
behavior that could lead to these losses, safety requirements and constraints, and the basic system control structure 
used to avoid these losses. The primary goal of STPA is to generate detailed safety requirements and constraints that 
must be implemented in the design in order to prevent the identified unacceptable losses. It achieves this goal by 
identifying unsafe control behavior and the scenarios that can lead to this behavior, including component failure 
scenarios. 
The goal of STPA is the same as traditional FTA, but STPA includes a broader set of potential scenarios 
including those in which no failures occur but the problems arise due to unsafe and unintended interactions among 
the system components. STPA also provides more guidance to the analysts than FTA. Functional control diagrams 
and a set of generic causal factors are used to guide the analysis. Fig. 2 shows the basic causal factors used in an 
STPA analysis of a functional control diagram. The next section describes the STPA process in more detail using a 
case study of its application to the JAXA HTV unmanned cargo spacecraft. 
 
 
Fig. 1  The role of the process model in a control loop. 
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III. Case Study:  Hazard Analysis of JAXA HTV Using STPA 
This section illustrates the use of STPA on a real spacecraft design. The relevant aspects of the spacecraft are 
first described and then the STPA analysis is presented. 
The HTV is an unmanned cargo transfer spacecraft that is launched from the Tanegashima Space Center aboard 
the H-IIB rocket and delivers supplies to the ISS. In the development of the HTV, NASA safety requirements were 
applied, and potential HTV hazards were analyzed using FTA, with the emphasis being on the hazards of the 
integrated operation phase (i.e., approaching, berthing with, and departure from the ISS). The results of the FTA-
based hazard analysis were documented in the hazard report. “Collision with the ISS” is the highest severity hazard 
and is the focus of the analysis shown in this paper. 
The validity of all the contents of the hazard report was reviewed by the NASA Safety Review Board, such as 
the identified hazard causes, the hazard controls used for the causes, the design of the control, and the verification 
method. NASA and JAXA also analyzed the hazards identified for the ISS-HTV integrated operation and 
documented the results as the Integrated Hazard Analysis (IHA). In addition to redundant design for identified 
safety-critical components, a collision avoidance maneuver (CAM) was implemented to abort from the ISS collision 
trajectory if redundant components fail. In accordance with the results of the IHA, NASA and JAXA defined the 
flight rules for the integrated operation. 
HTV operations can be divided into the following phases: (1) launch, (2) rendezvous with the ISS, (3) berthing 
with the ISS, (4) operations while berthed with the ISS, (5) undock/departure from the ISS, and (6) reentry. This 
paper focuses on the berthing phase, as shown in Fig. 3, because the ISS is involved in this phase and could be 
damaged by inadequate controls on the HTV final approach and capture operation and astronauts could be 
potentially injured or killed [6,7]. 
 
 
Fig. 2  Basic causes of unsafe control. 
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In Sec. II, three general causes of accidents in STAMP were identified. The first occurs when the control 
structure or control actions do not enforce the safety constraints, leading to unhandled or uncontrolled component 
failures, unhandled environmental disturbances or conditions, or unsafe interactions among system components. The 
STPA analysis for this type of loss is illustrated in Sec. II.B using the HTV capture operation (described in Sec. 
II.A). The second type of loss, control actions that are inadequately coordinated among multiple controllers, is 
illustrated by the HTV final approach phase. In this phase of operation, the HTV can be controlled by its own 
software, by the astronauts, by NASA mission controllers in Houston, and by JAXA mission controllers in Tsukuba. 
The potential exists for several of these controllers to inadvertently provide an unsafe combination of commands 
although each command may be “safe” by itself. Analysis of multiple controllers is described and illustrated in Sec. 
II.C. The third cause of accidents in STAMP, degradation of the control structure over time so that the safety 
constraints are no longer enforced, is primarily handled through operations and standard processes and is not 
considered further in this paper. 
 
 
A. Overview of the HTV Capture Operation 
After launch, the HTV performs an automated rendezvous flight to carry cargo to the ISS. As shown in Fig. 4, 
the HTV approaches the ISS from the nadir side of the ISS (R-bar approach). The HTV is then grappled by the 
station’s robotic arm, called the SSRMS (Space Station Remote Manipulator System), and berthed to the ISS. The 
HTV approach sequence (called proximity or PROX operations) proceeds in four stages.  
In the first stage, after final approach is given by the Mission Control Center at NASA’s Johnson Space Center 
in Houston (MCC-H), the HTV Mission Control Room (MCR) at Tsukuba Space Center (TKSC) commands the 
HTV to begin the Approach Initiation (AI) Maneuver. The HTV moves from the AI point to the final approach point 
500 m below the ISS guided by Relative Global Positioning System (RGPS) navigation. 
In the second stage, while keeping its attitude relative to the ISS by using its attitude control system, the HTV 
begins its final approach using a laser sensor called the Rendezvous Sensor (RVS), beaming the laser to the reflector 
located on the nadir side of the Kibo module (RVS navigation). 
The HTV holds its approach twice: at 250 m below the ISS (hold point) and at 30 m below the ISS (parking 
point). At the hold point, the HTV performs a 180-degree turn (yaw-around) to prepare for a Collision Avoidance 
Maneuver (CAM) in case of an emergency (for example, the HTV’s relative position is too close or relative 
approach rate is faster than the predefined threshold). 
Finally, once the HTV reaches 10 m below the ISS, called the Capture Box, the ISS crew disables the HTV 
thrusters by commanding the deactivation (Free Drift) and then manipulates the SSRMS to grapple the Flight 
Releasable Grapple Fixture (FRGF) of the HTV. 
 
 
Fig. 3  HTV berthing with the ISS (image courtesy of JAXA) [6]. 
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     During its final approach, the ISS crew can send commands to the HTV for immediate critical operations 
using the Hardware Command Panel (HCP) shown in Fig. 5. The HCP is deployed on the Robotics Work Station 
in the Cupola before the PROX Operations begin. The Abort function on the HCP moves the HTV away from 
the ISS. When FRGF Set is commanded, the FRGF is separated from the HTV (for example, to detach the HTV 
from the SSRMS in case the SSRMS cannot ungrapple the FRGF). Retreat causes the HTV to retreat to 30 m or 
100 m below the ISS. Hold commands the HTV to hold its approach. Finally, in Free Drift, the HTV thrusters 
are disabled for the capture operation 
 
 
 
STPA is illustrated on this procedure. 
 
 
Fig. 4  HTV proximity operations [6]. 
 
 
Fig. 5  Hardware Command Panel (HCP) (image courtesy of JAXA) [6]. 
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B. STPA Analysis 
STPA can be divided into three steps: 1) identifying potentially hazardous control actions, 2) identifying 
scenarios that could lead to these control actions, and 3) identifying potentially unsafe interactions among multiple 
controllers. 
1. Identifying Potentially Unsafe Control Actions (STPA Step 1) 
The first goal of STPA is to identify potentially unsafe control actions and thus the safety constraints that must 
be enforced in spacecraft design and operations. STPA views hazardous states as a result of ineffective control. 
Therefore, the assessment proceeds by identifying the potential for inadequate control of the system that could lead 
to a hazardous state. 
During the PROX Operations, the most serious accident is obviously a HTV collision with the ISS. It might not 
only result in loss of mission, but it could also lead to damage to the ISS modules or the SSRMS and potentially to 
ISS crew death or injury. 
      The functional control structure diagram is divided into two levels of abstraction in order to limit its complexity. 
Fig. 6 shows the Level-0 control structure diagram for the HTV capture operation. This control structure has five 
major components: ISS, HTV, NASA ground station (GS), JAXA GS, and Tracking and Data Relay Satellite 
(TDRS) as a backup communication system. Note that this diagram is a control model, not an architectural model. A 
functional control diagram is required because the analysis method is based on control theory and analyzes the 
functional behavior of the system and not just the physical structure.  
 
 
Fig. 6  Control structure for HTV capture operation – Level 0. 
 
 
Fig. 7 shows the Level-1 ISS control structure (the box in the upper left hand side of Fig. 6).  Major components 
inside the ISS include the Proximity Communication Command and Data Handling (PROX C&DH) system, the 
Hardware Command Panel (HCP), visual monitors/Portable Computer System (PCS), and the ISS crew. Connecting 
lines between those components show control actions, information, acknowledgments and feedback. There is also a 
voice loop connection between the ISSS crew, NASA mission control, and JAXA mission control. 
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Potential control actions are shown on the lines in the control structure diagram. For example, the ISS crew (Fig. 
7) can issue Free Drift, Abort/Retreat/Hold, and FRGF Separation commands. Fig. 8 lists important control actions 
around the time of the capture. After the HTV has reached the Capture Box, the JAXA GS sends an FRGF 
Separation ENABLE command, which enables FRGF separation in preparation for an emergency. The ISS crew then 
sends a Free Drift command using the HCP to disable the HTV guidance and control functions. If the capture is 
started without this deactivation, the contact with the robotic arm could be interpreted as a disturbance by an 
external force, which would trigger an automatic attitude control action. Once the HTV has been deactivated, the 
ISS crew manipulates the SSRMS to grapple the HTV as promptly as possible. After the successful capture, the 
JAXA GS issues an FRGF Separation INHIBIT command to the HTV to prevent an unintended separation. These 
four events are the critical proximate events of the capture operation. 
 
# Control Action from to Description
1
FRGF Separation 
Enable
JAXA GS HTV
Enable FRGF separation in preparation for an 
emergency
2
Free Drift
(Deactivation)
ISS
(Crew)
HTV Disable the HTV guidance and control functions
C Execute Capture
ISS
(Crew)
HTV
Manipulate the SSRMS to grapple FRGF of the 
HTV
3
FRGF Separation 
Inhibit
JAXA GS HTV
Inhibit FRGF separation to prevent an unintended 
separation after the capture
 
Fig. 8 Control action sequence during capture operation. 
 
 
Fig. 7  Control structure for HTV capture operation – ISS Level 1. 
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For each control action, the conditions under which it could lead to a system hazard were identified using the 
four general categories of unsafe control actions (UCAs) as described in Sec. II: “not providing causes hazard,” 
“providing causes hazard,” “wrong timing/order causes hazard,” and “stopping too soon/applying too long causes 
hazard.” Although variants of this type of classification have been used in other hazard and reliability analyses, they 
usually stop with this information. The identification of the unsafe control actions in STPA is only the beginning of 
the analysis. The ultimate goal is to identify all the scenarios that can lead to these unsafe control actions. Fig. 9 
shows the hazardous control actions identified. Because the ISS crew can issue Abort, Retreat, Hold, and FRGF 
Separation using the HCP, Fig. 9 includes these off-nominal commands in the analysis as well as the nominal 
control actions shown in Fig. 8. Each cell in the table shown in Fig. 9 describes the unsafe control actions, numbered 
from UCA1 through UCA22. The hazards to which each of these unsafe control actions could lead are summarized 
in Fig. 10. 
Once the unsafe control actions and related hazards have been identified, they can be translated into constraints 
(requirements) that must be enforced by the system design and operations. For example, if the capture is not 
executed early enough [UCA8, UCA12], the HTV will drift out of the capture box. In combination with no 
activation command or a late one [UCA17, UCA19], hazard H1 (HTV is drifting toward ISS while 
uncontrolled/deactivated) could occur. One safety constraint for this hazardous behavior is:  
SC1.1: The ISS crew must activate the HTV appropriately within T seconds after drift out. 
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# Control Action
Not Providing
Causes Hazard
Providing
Causes Hazard
Wrong Timing/Order
Causes Hazard
Stopping Too Soon
/Applying Too Long
Causes Hazard
1
FRGF Separation 
Enable
[UCA1] FRGF separation is not 
enabled when ready for capture
[UCA2] FRGF separation is 
enabled when not necessary 
(e.g. after successful capture)
EARLY: [UCA3] FRGF separation 
is enabled while not ready for 
immediate capture
EARLY: [UCA6] HTV is 
deactivated while not ready for 
immediate capture
LATE: [UCA7] HTV is not 
deactivated for a long time 
while FRGF separation is enabled
EARLY: [UCA11] Capture is 
executed before HTV is 
deactivated
LATE: [UCA12] Capture is not 
executed within a certain 
amount of time
3
FRGF Separation 
Inhibit
[UCA14] FRGF separation is not 
inhibited after successful 
capture
[UCA15] FRGF separation is 
inhibited when must be enabled 
(e.g., when capture is 
attempted)
LATE: [UCA16] FRGF separation 
is inhibited too late after 
successful capture
Abort
Retreat
Hold
[UCA17] Abort/Retreat/Hold is 
not executed when necessary 
(e.g., when HTV is drifting to ISS 
while uncontrolled)
[UCA18] Abort/Retreat/Hold is 
executed when not appropriate 
(e.g. after successful capture)
LATE: [UCA19] 
Abort/Retreat/Hold is executed 
too late when immediately 
necessary (e.g., when HTV is 
drifting to ISS while 
uncontrolled)
FRGF Separation
[UCA20] FRGF separation is not 
executed when necessary (e.g., 
when HTV is grappled unsafely)
[UCA21] FRGF separation is 
executed when not necessary 
(e.g., after successful capture)
LATE: [UCA22] FRGF separation 
is executed too late when 
immediately necessary (e.g., 
when HTV is grappled unsafely)
O
ff
-N
o
m
in
al
Free Drift
(Deactivation)
[UCA4] HTV is not deactivated 
when ready for capture
[UCA5] HTV is deactivated when 
not appropriate (e.g., while still 
approaching ISS)
2
C Execute Capture
[UCA8] Capture is not executed 
while HTV is deactivated
[UCA9] Capture is attempted 
when HTV is not deactivated
[UCA10] SSRMS hits HTV 
inadvertently
[UCA13] Capture operation is 
stopped halfway and not 
completed
 
 
Fig. 9  Potentially hazardous control actions during capture operation. 
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2. Identifying Causal Scenarios for Unsafe Control Actions (STPA Step 2) 
While some potentially unsafe behaviors can be designed out of the system without knowing all of the potential 
scenarios that can lead to those behaviors, more information about causality is usually needed. After the hazardous 
control behavior has been identified, design features are used to eliminate or control it or, if the system design 
already exists, the design is analyzed to determine if the potentially hazardous behavior has been eliminated or 
controlled in that design. Accomplishing this goal requires more information about the cause of the behavior, and 
this information is identified using the second step of STPA. The control structure diagram is evaluated using the 
potential control flaws in Fig. 2. 
As an example of further analysis in this step, the causal factors that can result in violating the safety constraint 
SC1.1 are shown in Fig. 11. In the figure, t and x denote the time elapsed since the HTV is deactivated and the 
HTV’s state vector, respectively. As required by the HTV flight rules, the ISS crew must capture the HTV within 99 
s from deactivation; otherwise, the HTV must be activated again. In addition, if the ISS crew confirms by the state 
vector feedback or visual monitoring that the HTV drifts out of the capture box, the HTV must be activated again. 
Therefore, t, x, the HTV flight mode (activated or deactivated), and visual information are the critical information 
for the crew to make an appropriate decision. If any of them is missing or inadequate, the crew must send an 
activation command to the HTV. 
 
UCA
H1
HTV is drifting to ISS while uncontrolled 
(deactivated) 5, 6, 8, 12, 17, 19
H2
HTV is unintendedly separated from SSRMS 
after successful capture 2, 14, 16, 21
H3
HTV provides unintended attitude control in 
proximity to SSRMS 4, 9, 11
H4
HTV is inclined by a large angle in proximity 
to SSRMS 10
H5
HTV cannot be separated immediately when 
grappled unsafely (e.g., windmill) 1, 13, 15, 20, 22
H6
HTV provides thrust while captured by 
SSRMS 18, 20, 22
A3 Loss of HTV mission H7
FRGF is unintendedly separated from HTV 
before or during capture 2, 3, 7, 21
Accident Hazard
A2
Collision with ISSA1
Damage to SSRMS
 
 
Fig. 10  Accidents, hazards, and unsafe control actions. 
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Fig. 12 shows examples of hazardous scenarios that could violate the safety constraint SC1.1. All the factors 
could lead to no activation or a late activation after drift out of the capture box, which would contribute to a collision 
with the ISS. One of the causes considered by STPA is crew process model inconsistency. For example, if the HTV 
was designed such that the flight mode feedback could be returned prematurely before it really was activated, an 
inconsistency could result. This kind of hazard cause should ideally be identified in early development and 
eliminated by the design. If the system already exists, as in the case of the HTV, the design must be evaluated with 
respect to each of these potential causal factors to determine whether the design prevents it or whether preventive or 
mitigation measures must be added. 
 
 
 
Fig. 11  Causal factors violating safety constraint SC1.1. 
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Causal Factor Example Scenario
ISS component failures Due to ISS component failure, the activation command is not processed 
although the ISS crew is trying to issue it.
ISS crew mistakes in issuing 
commands
The ISS crew issues a wrong command, which delays the activation of the 
HTV.
Due to freezing of the visual monitor, the ISS crew thinks that the HTV is 
still in the Capture Box when it has already drifted out of the Capture Box, 
which delays the activation of the HTV.
Due to incorrect flight mode feedback, the ISS crew thinks that the HTV is 
activated when it is not and therefore the crew does not issue the 
activation command.
Activation command 
missing/inappropriate
The activation command is corrupted during transmission and the ISS 
crew must reissue it, which delays the activation of the HTV.
Activation command delayed The activation command is delayed during transmission, which then 
delays the activation of the HTV.
HTV component failures Due to HTV component failure, the HTV does not execute the activation 
although it has received the activation command.
HTV state changes over time Due to the change in HTV's position relative to the ISS while the ISS crew 
was trying to issue a Retreat  command, the HTV now needs an Abort 
command instead of Retreat  to escape in a safe trajectory.
Out-of-range radio disturbance Out-of-range radio disturbance interferes with the activation command 
coming in.
Physical disturbance Physical disturbance by the SSRMS accelerates the change in HTV's 
attitude and the activation by the ISS crew is not in time.
t , x  feedback missing/inadequate Due to missing x  feedback during transmission, the ISS crew is confused 
and issues the activation command too late.
t , x  feedback delayed x  feedback is delayed during transmission and arrives too late for the ISS 
crew to issue an Abort  command in time.
t , x  feedback incorrect x  feedback is incorrect due to measurement inaccuracies. The ISS crew 
does not issue the activation command because they think the HTV is still 
in the Capture Box.
Filght mode feedback 
missing/inadequate
Flight mode feedback is not received and the ISS crew is confused and 
issues the activation command too late.
Filght mode feedback incorrect Flight mode feedback is incorrect and the ISS crew thinks that the HTV is 
activated when it is not and therefore does not issue the activation 
command.
Visual information 
missing/inadequate
Freezing of the visual monitor delays the activation command by the ISS 
crew.
Wrong information/directive from 
JAXA/NASA GS
Because of delayed information, the JAXA/NASA GS tells the ISS crew to 
capture the HTV when the crew should issue an Abort  command, which 
confuses the crew.
ISS crew process model inconsistent
 
 
Fig. 12  Example scenarios violating safety constraint SC1.1. 
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3. Analysis of the Results of the Case Study 
The feasibility of applying STPA to the HTV was demonstrated by the above analysis. In order to determine the 
usefulness of STPA, the hazard causes identified by STPA were compared with the existing FTA results. The 
objective of this comparison task was to answer the following two questions: 
1)  Do the hazard causes identified by STPA include the causes identified by FTA?  
2) Did STPA find additional causes that had not been identified by FTA? 
     In the comparison, the fault tree branches for the capture operation (previously prepared for the HTV) were 
compared with the STPA results by mapping the STPA hazard causes to the fault tree branches to identify the 
differences.  
The results from the comparison analysis answered the above two questions as follows: 
1) All the causal factors identified by FTA were found by STPA. 
2) STPA identified additional causal factors that had not been identified by FTA. 
     Causal factors that were identified by both methods and those by STPA only are listed in Fig.13. There were no 
causal factors identified by FTA that were not identified by STPA. Note that the people performing STPA were not 
familiar with the existing fault tree analysis and thus were not biased by them. 
 
 
Identified by both STPA and FTA Identified by STPA only
Controller • ISS component failures • ISS crew mistakes in issuing commands
• ISS crew process model inconsistent
Activation 
Command
• Activation command missing/inappropriate • Activation command delayed
Controlled Process • HTV component failures
• HTV state changes over time
• Physical disturbance
• Out-of-range radio disturbance
Acknowledgment 
of Control Action
• t , x  feedback missing/inadequate
• t , x  feedback delayed
• t , x  feedback incorrect
• Flight mode feedback missing/inadequate
• Flight mode feedback incorrect
• Visual information missing/inadequate
Other Controllers • Wrong information/directive from
• JAXA/NASA GS  
 
Fig. 13  General causal factors identified by both FTA and STPA and by STPA only. 
 
 
The result is not surprising as FTA concentrates on component failure while STPA considers such failures as 
well as other types of unsafe control such as process model inconsistency and causal factors related to delay of 
commands, delay of feedback, and acknowledgment of control actions. Some causal factors identified by the STPA 
are due to control flaws in the control loop involving total system integration among the ISS, HTV, and 
NASA/JAXA GS. In contrast, most of basic events identified by the FTA were events that occur by chance, such as 
component failures, and not potential flaws in the basic system design. 
In the review of the HTV design after the STPA analysis, some of the additional causal factors were found to 
have been considered and controlled in the actual HTV design and operation but were not explicitly identified by the 
FTA. 
One example is, of course, not proof of anything. The evidence on real systems, however, in a variety of 
industries is accumulating.  A few examples follow. The Missile Defense Agency tried STPA for a predeployment 
nonadvocate safety assessment of the new U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System for the hazard of inadvertent 
launch [8]. The system had been subjected to the traditional hazard analysis methods used in the defense sector. 
STPA was performed by 2 people over 6 months who started with no familiarity with the system. So many 
previously unknown scenarios for inadvertent launch were found that deployment and testing were delayed for 6 
months. In many of these scenarios, all the components were operating exactly as intended, but the complexity of 
the component interactions led to unanticipated system behavior. Examples include missing cases in software 
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requirements and timing problems in sending and receiving messages. STPA also identified component failures that 
could cause the hazard.  
The analysis of a new Air Traffic Control procedure (performed by two students) found more hazardous 
scenarios than a team of experts had found
 
[9].  In the analysis of a blood gas analyzer, STPA found 175 scenarios 
versus 75 found by a FMEA. The STPA analysis took much less time and resources (one person for a few weeks 
versus the FMEA, which required a team over many months). Only the STPA found the scenario that had led to the 
near death of a patient and a recall of the device by the FDA [10]. In fact, nine scenarios were found by the STPA 
that could lead to the hazardous behavior. A recent comparative study in nuclear power plants compared several 
different techniques, including STPA, fault trees, and FMEA. Only STPA found the scenario that had actually led to 
an accident in that plant. None of the analysts, of course, knew beforehand about the accident [11].  
C. Identifying Potentially Unsafe Interactions among Multiple Controllers 
A second cause of accidents (see Sec. II) is potential interference among uncoordinated control actions by 
multiple controllers. The collision between two aircraft over Überlingen, Germany, has been partially blamed on 
conflicting advisories to the pilots by the ground air traffic controller and TCAS II, the automated collision 
avoidance system on the two aircraft [13].
 
 One aircraft followed the ground advisory while the other aircraft 
followed the TCAS advisory. Other types of conflicts between multiple controllers are possible. 
In the previous section, a process for identifying unsafe control actions was described. Individually safe control 
actions by different controllers over common components, however, can interact in such way as to lead to a hazard. 
This section describes a procedure for identifying such hazardous scenarios.  
Fig. 14 is a variant of the table used in Step 1 STPA (Fig. 9) modified to consider multiple controllers. For 
interactions among N (>2) controllers, this tabular form can be extended to N dimensions. Each cell in the table 
represents one of the following four types of interactions: 
[A] denotes that only one safe control action is provided. This case does not lead to a hazard and need not be 
analyzed further. 
[B] denotes that multiple “individually safe” control actions are provided. This case could lead to a hazard. As 
one example, each controller may provide the same “safe” command to the system, with the second command 
overriding the second one, starting the process over and potentially exceeding the time limits for action. For these 
situations, the system should be designed or controlled such that only one safe control action is executed, even if a 
(possibly redundant) additional safe command is provided. 
[C] denotes that both “individually safe” and unsafe control actions are provided. For these potentially unsafe 
scenarios, the system needs to be designed or controlled such that the safe control action is properly executed 
without being interrupted by unsafe ones. 
[D] denotes that only unsafe control actions are provided. Designing the proper response to this case requires 
further causal analysis to identify the detailed scenarios that can be involved. 
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To identify causal scenarios for multiple unsafe control actions, the entire system must be considered from each 
controller’s point of view. Fig. 15 is similar to Fig. 2 but with multiple controllers of a common process. One 
difference is that each controller must also have a model of the other controller as well as a model of the controlled 
process. 
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Fig. 14  Potentially unsafe interactions of control actions between two controllers. 
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After the causal factors have been identified for each individual controller using Fig. 15 as a guide, specific 
hazardous scenarios can be built by combining the causal factors from each controller. For each possible hazardous 
scenario identified, each causal factor leading to this scenario should be eliminated or controlled in the system 
design or in operations. The HTV final approach phase is used as an example. 
The first case study focused on the HTV capture operation at the capture box. This second case study focused on 
the final approach phase from 30 m below the ISS up to the capture box. In this phase, the HTV performs an 
automatic approach to the ISS without any commands by the ISS crew or the ground station (GS) crew in the 
nominal case. If an emergency occurs, the ISS and GS crew can send off-nominal commands such as Hold, Retreat, 
and Abort. In addition to these two controllers, the HTV itself is capable of executing an Abort. Thus, this phase can 
be viewed as a triple-controller situation. 
Fig. 16 shows the availability and range of the off-nominal commands for each of the three controllers. In case of 
an emergency, the ISS and GS crew are supposed to issue Hold, Retreat, and Abort in the ranges of 30 to 15 m, 15  
to 10 m, and the capture box and beyond, respectively, while the HTV itself can execute an abort anywhere. If any 
of these commands are not provided, the HTV could eventually collide with the ISS. In other words, Abort is 
obviously the most critical command to avoid the collision because it is the final line of defence before the HTV 
collides with the ISS. For this reason, the Abort command is the focus of the example analysis. 
 
 
Fig. 15  Causal factors leading to unsafe interaction between double controllers. 
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Fig. 17 shows a detailed control structure for the HTV final approach phase, each controller augmented with a 
model of the controlled process and a model of the other controllers. The control structure for this phase, again, is 
composed of three controllers: the ISS crew, the GS crew, and the HTV Guidance Navigation and Control (GNC). 
For simplicity, the GS here represents both NASA and JAXA ground stations. The Tracking and Data Relay 
Satellite (TDRS) as a backup communication system is omitted to simplify the diagram. There is a voice loop 
connection between the ISS crew and the GS crew so that they can communicate with each other through the entire 
operation. The three off-nominal commands, Hold, Retreat, and Abort, as well as Free Drift are identified in Fig. 17 
as control actions provided by the ISS and GS crew. 
ISS Crew GS Crew HTV GNC
Hold    30 m — 15 m
Retreat    15 m — 10 m
Abort   
10 m (Capture Box) —
(HTV GNC: anywhere)
      : allowed to issue (by the design/flight rules)
      : not allowed but available
       : not available (by the software design)
Controller
Command Range
 
 
Fig. 16  Off-nominal command availability and range. 
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The first step of the analysis identifies unsafe interactions of multiple control actions using a table like the table 
shown in Fig. 14. Because there are three controllers in this case, a three-dimensional table is needed. The case 
considered is one where the HTV must be aborted immediately.  
Instead of Abort, the ISS crew could incorrectly provide Retreat or Free Drift while the GS crew could 
incorrectly provide Retreat or Hold. The HTV GNC is allowed to issue only the Abort command. Therefore, the 
following unsafe control actions for each controller must be considered: 
 
 
 
Fig. 17  Control structure for HTV final approach phase. 
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  ISS Crew: Individually safe, not providing, and providing Retreat or Free Drift 
  GS Crew: Individually safe, not providing, and providing Retreat or Hold 
  HTV GNC: Individually safe and not providing Abort 
Fig. 18 and Fig. 19 show the hazardous interactions identified. Each cell in the table is classified as one of the 
[A], [B], [C] and [D] categories already described.  
Detailed scenarios leading to these unsafe combinations of commands can be identified using combinations of 
the causal factors shown in Fig. 15. As an example, one possible scenario leading to D2 is 1) the ISS crew issues a 
Retreat command before the HTV initiates a self-abort because they do not want to waste time and fuel by starting 
all the final approach process over again; 2) the GS crew is satisfied with the Retreat provided by the ISS crew and 
no longer pays close attention; and 3) because a Retreat command has been provided by the ISS crew, the HTV 
GNC does not self-abort. 
Not all the causal factors leading to an unsafe interaction arise from multiple controller contributions: normal 
causal factors that are not related to multiple controllers, such as component failures and other causes as listed in Fig. 
2, could also be a trigger of unsafe interactions among multiple controllers. Therefore, the multiple controller 
hazards cannot be considered independently. 
Identifying potentially hazardous combinations of multiple control actions may be adequate to design prevention 
and mitigation measures. More detailed causal analysis will allow more effective and targeted mitigation measures. 
 
    
21 
 
Retreat Free Drift
[B1] Triple Abort  commands 
are redundantly provided by 
ISS crew, GS crew, and HTV 
GNC
[B2] Double Abort  commands 
are redundantly provided by 
GS crew and HTV GNC
[C1] Double Abort  commands 
are provided by GS crew and 
HTV GNC while a Retreat 
command is provided by ISS 
crew
[C2] Double Abort  commands 
are provided by GS crew and 
HTV GNC while a Free Drift 
command is provided by ISS 
crew
[B3] Double Abort  commands 
are redundantly provided by 
ISS crew and HTV GNC
[A1] Only a single Abort 
command is provided by HTV 
GNC
[C3] An Abort  command is 
provided by HTV GCN while a 
Retreat  command is provided 
by ISS crew
[C4] An Abort  command is 
provided by HTV GNC while a 
Free Drift  command is 
provided by ISS crew
R
et
re
a
t
[C5] Double Abort  commands 
are provided by ISS crew and 
HTV GNC while a Retreat 
command is provided by GS 
crew
[C6] An Abort  command is 
provided by HTV GNC while a 
Retreat  command is provided 
by GS crew
[C7] An Abort  command is 
provided by HTV GNC while 
double Retreat  commands are 
provided by ISS crew and GS 
crew
[C8] An Abort  command is 
provided by HTV GNC while a 
Retreat  command is provided 
by GS crew and a Free Drift 
command is provided by ISS 
crew
H
o
ld
[C9] Double Abort  commands 
are provided by ISS crew and 
HTV GNC while a Hold 
command is provided by GS 
crew
[C10] An Abort  command is 
provided by HTV GNC while a 
Hold  command is provided by 
GS crew
[C11] An Abort  command is 
provided by HTV GNC while a 
Retreat  command is provided 
by ISS crew and a Hold 
command is provided by GS 
crew
[C12] An Abort  command is 
provided by HTV GNC while a 
Free Drift  command is 
provided by ISS crew and a 
Hold  command is provided by 
GS crew
G
S 
C
re
w
 A
b
o
rt
"I
n
d
iv
id
u
al
ly
 S
af
e
"
C
au
se
s 
H
az
ar
d
N
o
t 
P
ro
vi
d
in
g
C
au
se
s 
H
az
ar
d
P
ro
vi
d
in
g 
C
au
se
s 
H
az
ar
d
HTV GNC Abort : "Individually Safe" Causes Hazard
          ISS
 GS          
ISS Crew Abort
"Individually Safe"
Causes Hazard
Not Providing
Causes Hazard
Providing Causes Hazard
 
 
Fig. 18  Unsafe interactions between the three controllers (HTV GNC Abort: “Individually Safe” Causes Hazard). 
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Retreat Free Drift
[B4] Double Abort  commands are 
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Fig. 19  Unsafe interactions between the three controllers (HTV GNC Abort: Not Providing Causes Hazard). 
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Up to this point, unsafe interactions have been considered by looking at the combinations of control actions only. 
However, the context of each control action is also a key factor involved in unsafe interactions. A table like that 
shown in Fig. 14 is useful to identify the combinations, but context is important because multiple control actions can 
have differing temporal relationships. Some contexts are unsafe while others are not, even if they are composed of 
the same control actions. One type of analysis of the potential scenarios involves identifying the unsafe contexts.  
Fig. 20 shows an example. In this diagram, time is shown horizontally and the controllers are shown vertically.  
The changes of the state of the controlled process are denoted with color and fill patterns. . In this context, there are 
two states, the actual state and the state expected by the controller. These two states are not always consistent. A 
controller expects that a controlled process is changed from a specific state to another by its control action. This is 
represented in Fig. 20 by a diagonally divided control action with color and fill patterns (e.g. "Issue Control Action 
1", "Issue Control Action 2").  However the actual state of the controlled process could be changed by the other 
controller without the first controller knowing it. As a result, the first controller could execute an inconsistent control 
action with the actual state of the controlled process, such as "Issue Control Action 1" in Fig. 20. 
 
In Fig. 20, Controller 1 and Controller 2 first receives feedback about the state of the controlled process.  
Controller 2 then sends a notification to Controller 1. Controller 2 issues Control Action 2 and the state of the 
Controlled Process is changed. Next, Controller 2 gets feedback from the controlled process. Controller 1 issues 
Control Action 1 without knowing that the controlled process state has been changed. Controller 2 sends notification 
to Controller 1 but Controller 1 has already sent Control Action 1 based on the previous state of the process.  
Although context can be analyzed with a context diagram, it would be inefficient and unrealistic to generate all 
possible contexts. Instead, preconditions and postconditions of the control actions can be used to define and identify 
interference. The preconditions can involve the state of controller itself, the state of controlled process, external 
conditions of system, and so on. Postconditions denote changes to the state of the controlled process and the 
controller itself as a result of the control action. Interference among control actions occurs when 1) the preconditions 
Fig. 20 Example of context diagram 
Get 
feedback 
Get 
feedback 
Control Action 1 
is executed. 
(State is changed.) 
Send 
Notification 
Receive 
Notification 
Issue Control 
Action 1 
Issue Control 
Action 2 
Get 
feedback 
Send 
Notification 
Receive 
Notification 
Get 
feedback 
Inconsistency between 
the expected state by 
Controller 1 and the 
actual state 
Inconsistency between 
the expected state by Controller 1 
and the actual state 
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of control actions are inconsistent or 2) the postcondition of a control action is inconsistent with a precondition of 
another control action. 
 
 
 Precondition  Postcondition  
Control Action 1  
 Receiving feedback 
 
 Receiving Notification 
 Updating feedback 
(Changing the state of Controlled Process) 
 
 Issuing Notification 
Control Action 2   Receiving feedback 
 Updating feedback 
(Changing the state of Controlled Process) 
 
 Issuing Notification 
 
Fig. 21  Example condition table for Fig. 20 
 
Fig. 21 shows the preconditions and postconditions for the example in Fig. 20. Obviously, the postcondition 
"Issuing Notification" (shown in red) of Control Action 2, can change the contents of one of the preconditions of  
Control Action 1, “Receiving Notification" shown in red. 
. This approach to identifying interference can be applied not only to nominal control actions but also potentially 
unsafe control actions in each single controller (“not providing causes hazard,” “providing causes hazard,” “wrong 
timing/order causes hazard,” and “stopping too soon/applying too long causes hazard.”).  
SpecTRM, a system and software engineering environment that supports safety engineering processes such as 
hazard analysis [13]
 
was used to experimentally validate the feasibility of using this method to identify interference. 
SpecTRM allows modeling preconditions and postconditions and automated checking for consistency and 
interference. Focusing on the "B type" combinations between GS (ground station) crew and ISS crew, 15 types 
(preconditions) of individually safe control actions by the JAXA GS crew and 8 by the ISS Crew were analyzed. 
Several unsafe interferences between the ISS Crew and the GS crew were identified even when only individually 
safe control actions are issued. 
Fig. 22 and Fig. 23 show the preconditions and postconditions for the GS Crew and ISS Crew to execute Abort 
and Hold. In the figures, the conditions about the flight mode (FM) of the HTV, the HTV's position (state vector or 
SV), the state of a sensor (Rendezvous Sensor State or RVSS), are specified mathematically. SV3, SV4 and SV5 are 
distance data of the HTV, with each one indicating a different kind of distance. "SV3 > 70", for example, means the 
distance is over 70 m. Fig. 24 shows the context diagram. In this case, the ISS crew issues a Hold command after the 
GS crew issues an Abort. This control sequence is potentially hazardous because the postcondition of the Abort (FM 
= Abort) is inconsistent with one of the preconditions of the Hold (FM = Approach OR FM = Retreat). Because it is 
hazardous for the HTV to stop temporarily or not to finish after it starts an abort, the safety constraint that the HTV 
must finish aborting once it starts to abort must imposed on the HTV. To avoid this hazard, the actual HTV system 
is designed to reject a Hold command by the HTV GNC when the HTV is aborting.  
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No 
Control 
Action 
Precondition Postcondition 
1 Hold 1 
( FM = Approach OR FM = Hold OR FM = Retreat ) 
AND 
( 
( SV3 > 70 AND 200 < SV4 < 250 ) 
OR 
( SV3 > 40 AND 100 < SV4 < 200 ) 
OR 
( SV3 > 15 AND 30 < SV4 < 100 ) 
OR 
( SV3 > 5 AND 15 < SV4 < 30 ) 
 OR 
( SV3 > 3.7 AND 15 < SV4 < CAPTURE_POINT)  
) 
FM = Abort  
 
Fig. 22  Part of a condition table of GS Crew. 
 
 
 
 
No 
Control 
Action 
Precondition Postcondition 
1 Hold 1 
30 < SV4 < 250 
AND 
VC = broken 
AND 
SV1 < KOS 
AND 
RVSS = ONLY ONE FUNCTIONING 
AND 
SV5 > 15 
 AND 
(FM = Approach  OR  FM = Retreat) 
FM = Hold 
 
Fig. 23  Part of a condition table of ISS Crew. 
 
26 
 
IV. Conclusions  
As spacecraft become more and more complex, the limitations of traditional hazard analysis techniques are 
revealed. More powerful techniques are needed that can handle the new causes of accidents in these systems. This 
paper presents a new hazard analysis technique called STPA (System-Theoretic Process Analysis). STPA was 
illustrated on the analysis of the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) H-II Transfer Vehicle capture and 
approach phases. 
Because a fault tree analysis had been performed on the H-II Transfer Vehicle, a comparison of the results of the 
two analysis techniques was possible. For the first case study, STPA identified a total of 22 unsafe control actions 
and seven hazards for the capture operation. One of the hazards (and one of its safety constraints) was selected for 
further analysis and the STPA results compared with the existing fault tree analysis-based hazard report for the 
spacecraft. The comparison showed that STPA identified the causal factors identified in the fault tree analysis,  but 
STPA also identified additional causal factors that had not been identified by fault tree analysis. The additional 
factors include those that cannot be identified using fault tree analysis, including software and system design as well 
as system integration of the International Space Station, the H-II Transfer Vehicle, and the NASA/JAXA Ground 
Stations. 
The second case study showed how STPA can identify possible unsafe interactions among multiple controllers 
that are caused by conflicting or uncoordinated control actions. The multiple controller problem cannot be captured 
by fault tree analysis, and, therefore, no comparison was necessary. 
Finding unsafe design errors after a system is already designed is not as useful as using hazard analysis to drive 
the design from the beginning. Because STPA treats safety as a control problem, an existing design is not necessary 
to perform the analysis (as is required for fault tree analysis and failure modes and effects analysis), and potentially 
the analysis and design processes can proceed in parallel, each supporting the other.  
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Fig. 24 Example of context diagram 
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